Abstract Grid computing is concerned with the sharing and coordinated use of diverse resources in dynamic, distributed \virtual organizations." The dynamic nature of Grid environments introduces challenging security concerns that demand new technical approaches. In this brief overview, we review key Grid security issues and outline the technologies that are being developed to address those issues. We focus in particular on work being done within the context of the Open Grid Services Architecture, a new initiative aimed at recasting key Grid concepts within a serviceoriented framework. This work involves a tight i n tegration with Web services mechanisms and appears particularly relevant t o t h e c o n c e r n s of e-services.
INTRODUCTION
The term \Grid" is frequently used to refer to systems and applications that integrate and manage resources and services that are distributed across multiple control domains. Initially pioneered in the escience context, Grid technologies have r e c e n tly generated considerable interest in the e-business context, as a result of the apparent r e l e v ance of Grid distributed management concepts and mechanisms to a variety of commercial distributed computing scenarios.
A common scenario within Grid computing|and, we believe, within an increasing number of e-business scenarios|is the formation of dynamic \virtual organizations" (VOs) comprising groups of individuals and associated resources and services united by a common purpose but not located within a single administrative domain. The need to support the integration and management of resources within such V Os introduces challenging security issues. In particular, we h a ve to deal with the fact that for a variety of issues relating to certi cation, group membership, authorization, and the like, participants in such V Os represent a n o verlay with respect to whatever trust relationships exist between individual participants and their parent organizations.
Research in Grid computing is producing solutions to some of these problems based around not direct interorganizational trust relationships but rather the use of the VO as a bridge among the entities participating in a particular community or function. The results of this research h a ve been incorporated into a software systems called the Globus Toolkit that is now seeing widespread use. They are also being incorporated into standards through work on the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) being conducted within the Global Grid Forum (GGF).
In the remainder of this overview article, we outline the nature of the Grid security problem, provide examples of Grid security solutions, and review work being conducted within GGF on OGSA security. W e provide plentiful references to other sources for additional information. Figure 1 illustrates a common situation in Grid computing. Two organizations, A and B, each operate their own corporate security s olutions that address certi cation, authentication, authorization, and so forth. Between the two organizations, however, no trust relationship exists. We n o w assume that an entity in subdomain A1 wishes to access a resource managed by another individual in subdomain B1 with whom he is engaged in some collaborative activity. (More speci cally, a s w e show here, a task initiated by the rst individual wishes to invoke a n operation on a server located in subdomain B1.)
GRID SECURITY AND CERTIFICATION
In principle, the establishment o f s u c h a sharing relationship should be straightforward. In practice, however, it can be extremely di cult for at least three di erent reasons:
1 Cross certi cation. The entity from A1 can obtain a credential certi ed by some certi cation authority in domain A. But in the absence of a trust relationship between A and B, an entity i n d omain B cannot enforce policies requiring that that credential is issued by a n a p p r o ved certi cation authority. W e need a means of establishing cross-certi cation between A and B. Or rather we need a means of establishing cross-certi cation among the entities participating in the VO.
2 Mechanisms and credentials. Assuming that the cross-certi cation problem is solved, we then face another problem. A and B may rely on quite di erent security m e c hanisms and credential formats.
3 Distributed authorization. Another di culty that arises is that individual entities in one domain are not necessarily well positioned to know all foreign requestors and thus to enforce ne-grained policies based on identity o r o t h e r c haracteristics.
4 Other issues. Other issues that must be addressed in the VO context include logging and auditing (how d o w e merge logs and perform auditing across VO resources?).
One approach to addressing these issues is to establish high-level interinstitutional agreements concerning cross-certi cation, mechanisms and credential formats, authorization, auditing, and so forth. These agreements can be di cult to negotiate, however, because of potentially broad legal implications, liability issues, and the inevitable engagement of central bureaucracies. In practice, many s u c h relationships do not require involvement of upper management: as long as they are consistent with institutional policies, they can be established by organizational subunits or individuals.
These observations have m o t i v ated the adoption within Grid computing of approaches in which the virtual organization is used as a bridge and federation is achieved within the VO through mutually trusted services. As illustrated in Figure 2 , entities within the VO domain rely on some mutually trusted VO service to establish trust and use some negotiated common mechanism to negotiate access. Local policy authorities continue to play a role, serving as the nal arbiters of what is allowed on a particular resource.
In the following, we describe mechanisms that have been developed based on this concept to address cross-certi cation, common credentials and mechanisms, and distributed authorization.
CROSS CERTIFICATION AND COMMON CREDENTIALS AND MECHANISMS
Consider the two domains illustrated in Figure 3 . We assume that domain A uses Kerberos mechanisms for certi cation, authentication, and so forth, while domain B uses some other scheme. We also assume a l a c k of trust relationships between domains A and B. Figure 3 illustrates a particular implementation of a VO bridging solution to these two problems, based on the use of (a) a bridging certi cation service (the Kerberos-CA service) and (b) standard X.509 credentials and Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) mechanisms. The KX509 service and the Globus Toolkit provide commonly used open source implementations of these two functions, respectively.
In brief, participants in the VO agree to use X.509 credentials and GSI protocols as common mechanisms. To address the cross-certi cation requirement, they also agree to trust a VO service, the Kerberos-CA service, as a means of gatewaying from domain A's Kerberos credentials to VO X.509 credentials. An entity in A1 that wishes to issue a request to an entity i n B 1 m ust thus rst issue a Kerberos-authenticated request to the Kerberos-CA service to obtain an (short-lived) X.509 credential that asserts the requestor's Kerberos principal name. T h e A 1 e n tity (the requestor) can then present this credential to the entity in B1. The latter entity has a trust relationship with the Kerberos-CA service and can thus verify the authenticity of the credential (e.g., by c hecking the signature chain) prior to applying VO policies (based on the requestor's Kerberos principal name) and/or local policies to determine whether the request should be granted.
DISTRIBUTED AUTHORIZATION
A simplistic implementation of the system just described has the disadvantage that each resource in the VO m ust know all foreign requestors if ne-grained policy is to be applied. A solution to this problem is to outsource ne-grained policy administration to a trusted third party within the requestor's domain (or the VO domain) who can more easily maintain information about all requestors. The local domain can, of course, continue to maintain and apply coarse-grained policy locally.
This idea is implemented within the Community Authorization Service (CAS). As depicted in Figure 4 , an entity wishing to access another CAS-enabled entity rst issues a request to the CAS server. The CAS server consults policy rules for its users and, if access is granted, returns a capability credential that can be presented at the target entity. That entity then needs to apply only coarse-grained policy rules based on the CAS identity, although it can of course still apply other local policy.
OPEN GRID SERVICES ARCHITECTURE
The preceding discussion introduced some representative G r i d s e c urity issues and technologies such as GSI, KX509, and CAS that are being used to address these issues. Those technologies represent the current state of the art and are being used extensively in various Grid projects.
Nevertheless, research and development e orts continue within the Grid community with the goals of on the one hand continuing to expand functionality (e.g., for more general policy speci cation and enforcement and for auditing) and on the hand exploiting standards emerging from the Web services security (WS security) initiative. Working within the context of the Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA), these e orts are expected to produce input to the WS Security process and new pro les and service de nitions that build on WS Security standards.
OGSA represents a refactoring, re nement, and repackaging of current Grid protocols to better expose various useful elements, incorporate new functionality, e m brace a service-oriented model, and leverage emerging Web services technologies. OGSA leverages experience gained with the Globus Toolkit to de ne conventions and WSDL interfaces for a Grid service, a (potentially transient) stateful service instance supporting reliable and secure invocation (when required), lifetime management, notication, policy management, credential management, and virtualization. OGSA also de nes interfaces for the discovery of Grid service instances and for the creation of transient Grid service instances.
Current goals for OGSA security w ork are outlined within an architecture document and roadmap that are being developed within the Global Grid Forum. Figure 5 , taken from ?], summarizes the key components as currently conceived. The current drafts of these documents focus on de ning possible relationships between OGSA security m e c hanisms and emerging WS Security m e c hanisms. Thus, they identify a set of required services and indicate for each whether it is de nitely provided by WS Security speci cations, is expected to be provided by future WS Security speci cations, or requires the de nition of standardized pro les and/or mechanisms, and/or extensions to WS Security speci cations. It is expected, however, that other technologies|for example, SAML, and speci cations being developed within the Project Liberty Alliance| may also have a signi cant role to play. One task to be addressed by the OGSA Security w orking group within the Global Grid Forum is to develop an understanding of where other technologies should be used in this overall Grid security w ork.
SUMMARY
Research and application studies in Grid computing have been investigating for some time various issues that are fundamental to e-services. In particular, these studies have addressed the need to provide security and certi cation services for dynamically formed groups of services, resources, and people|what are often called virtual organizations. The basic technical approach adopted has been to use the virtual organization as a bridging mechanism among its participants.
Existing Grid technologies provided by the Globus Toolkit and related technologies address basic issues of cross-certi cation, standard credential formats, standard security m e c hanisms, and community a uthorization. These technologies have seen widespread adoption within the e-science community and are also starting to see use in industry.
Current w ork focused on the development of an Open Grid Services Architecture appears even more relevant to e-services, because of its strongly service-oriented architecture and its adoption of Web services technologies. This work is moving quickly within the Global Grid Forum, and both open source and commercial implementations are appearing. 
